This paper studies the impact of trading on government bond prices surrounding the release of macroeconomic news. The results show a significant increase in the informational role of trading following economic announcements, which suggests the release of public information increases the level of information asymmetry in the government bond market. The informational role of trading is greater after announcements with a larger initial price impact, and the relation is associated with the surprise component of the announcement and the precision of the public information. The results provide evidence that government bond order f low reveals fundamental information about riskless rates.
WHEN SOME MARKET PARTICIPANTS have private information about the value of an asset, their trades reveal information to the market. In equilibrium, the sensitivity of prices to order f low will depend on the prevailing level of information asymmetry. This concept was first formalized by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) , and since that time many researchers have sought to characterize the link between information asymmetry and the impact of trading on prices. This paper studies transaction data from the U.S. Treasury market in order to clarify the informational role of trading in financial markets.
In equity markets, private information is traditionally considered to be advanced knowledge of a firm's cash f lows. For example, Koski and Michaely (2000) find that trades preceding dividend announcements have a larger than usual impact on prices. On the other hand, Verrecchia (1994, 1997) suggest that public information releases may actually increase information asymmetry if market participants differ in their ability to interpret the news. Krinsky and Lee (1996) offer empirical support for this type of private information, finding that the informational role of trading increases after earnings announcements.
Research in currency markets supports a broader view of information asymmetry. Peiers (1997) shows that Deutsche Bank is a price leader prior to German Central Bank interventions, and Ito, Lyons, and Melvin (1998) provide evidence that Japanese banks are perceived as informed traders in yen currency markets. Lyons (1995) and Cao, Evans, and Lyons (2002) suggest that information asymmetry in FX markets arises from dealers' private access to customer order f low, which could help predict short-term exchange rate movements. Evans and Lyons (2002) and Evans (2002) argue that order f low may perform a more important function, informing market participants about economic fundamentals.
Government bond markets provide an opportunity to clarify the relation between information asymmetry and the informational role of trading. U.S. Treasury securities have fixed and virtually riskless cash f lows. Does order f low reveal information in a market with no private information about cash f lows?
If so, what is the source of the information asymmetry? This paper addresses these issues by studying the impact of trading on government bond prices surrounding the release of macroeconomic news. The informational role of trading is measured using a structural model to infer the asymmetric information component of the effective bid-ask spread. The approach, a generalized version of Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) (MRR) , allows the informational role of trading to vary with characteristics of the announcement.
Although microstructure models have been used extensively in equity and foreign exchange markets, this paper is among the first to fit a structural model to government bond transaction data.
1 Since little is known about the efficacy of this type of methodology on bond markets, I also rely on a simple nonparametric approach similar to Koski and Michaely (2000) . The robustness checks confirm the effectiveness of the model at capturing variation in the informational role of trading.
I find that the sensitivity of prices to order f low is lower than usual before economic announcements, which is consistent with no information leakage. The informational role of trading increases following announcements, indicating that the release of public information raises the level of information asymmetry in the government bond market. The enhanced informational role of trading is consistent with the interpretation that some market participants have an advantage at determining how macro news inf luences riskless rates. On the other hand, the information asymmetry may be of a more pedestrian variety, related to inventory-oriented information that is security specific. To help characterize the nature of information asymmetry in government bond markets, I examine how the informational role of trading evolves after economic news, as well as how it varies with characteristics of the announcement.
Theoretical models offer predictions of how announcement characteristics will inf luence the informational role of trading. In the skilled information processor models of Verrecchia (1994, 1997) , the accuracy of private interpretations is unrelated to the precision of the public signal. Thus, information asymmetry is lower following more precise information releases. Alternatively, if the information asymmetry is related to inventory imbalances, an opposite relation could develop. In the Cao et al. (2002) model, for example, compensation for bearing inventory risk introduces a link between order f low and prices even if customer order f low is uninformed. In the current setting, order f low may provide information as to whether a particular bond should be priced above or below the yield curve even if trading provides no fundamental information about the yield curve.
2 If announcements with greater price impacts generate more hedging demands, then dealers with sizable customer order f lows will hold a greater informational advantage following more precise information releases. Thus, information asymmetry would be higher following more precise information releases.
The results indicate that announcements with greater price impacts result in a larger increase in the informational role of trading. The positive relation is associated with both the precision of the public information signal and the surprise component of the announcement. This result is more consistent with the inventory model of Cao et al. (2002) . Although the evidence presents a challenge to existing information processor models, these can be adapted to ref lect this result. For example, in the context of the Verrecchia (1994, 1997) models, the results imply that information processors' skills improve with the surprise and precision of the public information release. Extending the models in this way seems reasonable given that economists are likely to devote more effort to interpreting economic news deemed important by the market.
The increased information asymmetry following announcements dissipates quickly, which provides more direct support for the superior information processor interpretation. Although Fleming and Remolona (1999) document that trading volume remains high for several hours after announcements, I find that the informational role of trading returns to near-normal levels within 15 minutes. The trading environment remains highly liquid during the subsequent 15 minutes, yet prices are much less volatile and trading has a smaller impact on prices. Consequently, we might expect uninformed traders to be patient with their orders. The extended period of active trading following announcements is consistent with this hypothesis, but it makes it less likely that uncertainty regarding customers' hedging trades would be resolved quickly. Thus, the rapid reduction in the level of information asymmetry suggests that the trading immediately after announcements reveals information that extends beyond security specific information.
Taken together, the results highlight the importance of information asymmetry in the U.S. Treasury market and support the hypothesis that order f low reveals fundamental information about riskless rates. The evidence that prices are more sensitive to order f low during a period of enhanced liquidity is in contrast to the findings of Fleming (2001) and Brandt and Kavajecz (2003) , who find more generally a negative relation between trade impact and liquidity. While these authors argue that low liquidity indicates periods with uncertain valuations, I find that the release of public information also generates a brief period of uncertainty regarding bond prices. The results suggest that market participants actively watch trading to help determine the effect of new economic information on riskless rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the transaction data from the interdealer market for U.S. Treasury securities and the macroeconomic announcement data. Section II follows with a description of the methodology for measuring the impact of trading on transaction prices. Section III presents the empirical results, and Section IV summarizes the conclusions of this study.
I. Data

A. Transaction Data for U.S. Treasuries
Secondary trading of U.S. Treasury securities takes place in an over-thecounter market. Although more than a thousand banks and securities firms operate as Treasury dealers, the majority of trading volume is facilitated by the small number of primary dealers (there were less than 40 primary dealers during the sample period). In addition to participating in Treasury auctions, primary dealers provide the Federal Reserve Bank of New York with information on market conditions and facilitate the Central Bank's open market operations.
Interdealer trading is an integral part of the Treasury market. According to the Federal Reserve Bulletin (1993) , approximately half of primary dealers' transactions involve other primary dealers. Unlike foreign exchange markets, which also have highly active interdealer markets, virtually all trading of U.S. Treasury securities between dealers is conducted anonymously through interdealer brokers.
3 Brokers gather dealers' quote and depth information for bills, notes, bonds, and agency debt securities, and post the data on proprietary computer screens that are provided to the dealers.
The transaction data is obtained from GovPX, Inc. GovPX consolidates quote and trade information from the interdealer market for U.S. Treasury securities and disseminates it through information providers such as Bloomberg. 4 The data set contains historical intraday bid and offer quotes along with transaction prices and trade sizes for all Treasury bills, notes, and bonds. One of the advantages of GovPX transaction data is that each trade is accompanied by an indication as to which side initiated the trade. Although trade size is negotiable, all brokered transactions occur at posted bid or ask quotes, which makes determining trade direction straightforward. As in Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999) and Boni and Leach (2002) , I examine the most recently issued, or "on-the-run," five-year Treasury note, which is the most frequently traded bond in the GovPX sample. I focus on trading around the 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time release of macroeconomic data and restrict the sample to trades that take place between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. The sample period spans July 1, 1991 through September 29, 1995 and includes over 75,000 trade observations. Time stamps occur in the database every minute and each transaction is timed to the minute of the most recent time stamp. However, the time stamps often occur within the minute (8:13:21, 8:14:21, etc.) , so it is often not possible to determine which trades take place immediately before and after an announcement release. In addition, announcements may not be released at precisely 8:30 according to the GovPX clock. I account for these issues by omitting trades around announcements to ensure the price change spans the release. In particular, I omit two trades prior to 8:30 unless the trades occur before 8:28, and five trades after 8:30 unless they occur after 8:32.
5 Admittedly, this method is ad hoc but the results are not sensitive to changes in the procedure.
B. Survey and Announcement Data
The data on economic announcements is obtained from MMS International (now a subsidiary of Standard and Poor's), a widely used source of forecast data for studies of economic announcements. MMS surveys approximately 40 money market economists each Friday regarding the upcoming week's announcements and records information on the median forecast, the 25 th and 75 th percentile forecasts, the standard deviation of the forecasts, and the announcement realization. Table I lists the 12 economic announcements released at 8:30 a.m. ET. I focus on a single release time in order to examine differences across announcements while controlling for time-of-day effects, and more macro announcements are released at 8:30 a.m. than any other time. Announcements are released monthly with the exception of the weekly initial jobless claims figures. Table I also reports the units for each macro series. Levels are reported as units, dollars, or as percentages. Changes are reported as either absolute in units or dollars, or as a percentage change from the previous observation. Announcement surprise is measured as the realized value minus the median survey value. As in Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) and Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) , I standardize surprises to facilitate comparisons across announcements. In particular, for announcement type k on day τ , the surprise is defined as
where A kτ and F kτ are the actual value and median forecast, and σ k is the standard deviation of (A kτ − F kτ ). Thus, an announcement surprise equal to 1.0 implies a surprise that is one standard deviation greater than zero for that announcement type. Forecast dispersion measures are standardized in a similar manner. For each measure of dispersion, I subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation for that measure of dispersion. A dispersion measure equal to -1.0 implies that the forecast dispersion is one standard deviation smaller than the average dispersion for that announcement type. transaction, and the average quoted bid-ask spread (in basis points). 6 The active five-year note is heavily traded with average hourly volume measured in hundreds of millions of dollars. In the half-hour before announcements, trading intensity is lower than usual, bid-ask spreads are wider than usual, and price volatility is lower than usual. In the 15 minutes immediately following the release of the news, price volatility increases along with trading intensity and trade size. In the next 15 minutes, trading activity continues to increase while quoted bid-ask spreads narrow.
C. Descriptive Statistics
The pattern in trading, volatility, and spreads is consistent with the findings of Balduzzi et al. (2001) and Fleming and Remolona (1999) . Rather than focusing on the levels of volume and volatility as in previous work, in this paper I investigate how they interrelate by studying the sensitivity of prices to signed order f low. Figure 1 offers a preliminary look. The chart plots the sequence of transaction prices, designated as buyer-or seller initiated, from 8:00-9:00 a.m. on November 4, 1994, a day on which the monthly employment number was announced at 8:30.
Although quoted bid-ask spreads are wider than usual before the announcement, the figure shows that transaction prices stay within a narrow range, suggesting a general consensus about the value of the bond. The sentiment of the news is clear in that prices fall immediately after the announcement of higher than expected employment, but the initial price response is followed by increased volatility and trading intensity. Moreover, transaction prices appear much more sensitive to a sequence of buys or sells, which suggests that market participants may be watching order f low to help interpret the news. The next section describes the methodology used to quantify the sensitivity of transaction prices to order f low.
II. Methodology
I measure the informational role of trading by isolating the component of effective bid-ask spreads that is related to information asymmetry. The approach is based on the price formation model of MRR. 7 The MRR model is a generalized version of earlier microstructure models such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Stoll (1989) , and it allows the order f low to be auto-correlated, which is a feature of the bond transaction data. The MRR model attributes transaction price changes to unanticipated public information and microstructure effects, and decomposes effective spreads into absolute components rather than relative spread shares.
The model isolates the spread components by examining the relation between transaction price changes and signed order f low. For example, transaction price changes measured from a purchase followed by another purchase ref lect the extent to which dealers adjust their quotes upward in response to the information revealed by the first purchase. Transaction price changes measured from a purchase followed by a sale will ref lect both information asymmetry and dealers' compensation for providing liquidity. This idea is formalized in equation (4) of MRR, which posits the following evolution of transaction price changes:
The independent variable x t measures order f low: x t = 1 if the transaction is buyer initiated and x t = −1 if the trade is seller initiated. The parameter θ represents the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread and measures the information revealed by order f low. When order f low is auto-correlated (i.e., buyer-initiated trades are more likely to be followed by buyer-initiated trades, etc.), only the surprise portion of order f low reveals information. The parameter ρ is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of order f low, and it is used to determine expected order f low (ρx t−1 ), from which the surprise component is measured.
The parameter φ represents compensation for providing liquidity and includes any order processing costs. This component of the spread also captures the effects of dealer inventories to the extent that dealers set wider spreads when they are more concerned about inventory imbalances. Isolating the effects of inventories on the spread is not possible due to the anonymous trading environment of the interdealer market, which prevents tracking dealer inventories. Vitale (1998) indicates this may not be a serious concern. He finds no evidence of inventory effects in the U.K. Treasury market and suggests that this may be due to the availability of many hedging instruments. Nevertheless, dealers' inventory positions could be an important source of information asymmetry. Since dealer inventories are not observable, I study the implications of inventory-oriented private information on the evolution of trade impact following announcements as well as how trade impact varies with announcement characteristics.
The MRR model assumes that order size is fixed. Fleming (2001) studies U.S. Treasury market liquidity using a different methodology and finds that signed volume is less effective at explaining price movements than the net number of trades. However, as a robustness check, I investigate the appropriateness of the trade size restriction using a nonparametric approach.
The error term, e t , includes unanticipated public information released between transactions as well as rounding error due to price discreteness. As in MRR, standard errors of the coefficients are calculated using the NeweyWest procedure to obtain a heteroskedasticity consistent estimate of the covariance matrix.
8 Statistical significance is measured using likelihood ratio tests that compare the restricted and unrestricted GMM criterion functions (see Chapter 17 of Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) ).
I examine how economic announcements inf luence the informational role of trading through several modifications to equation (2). First, to capture the direct effect of economic news on prices, I include additional independent variables. Adjusting equation (1) to ref lect transaction time, let S kt be the standardized surprise component of announcement type k that occurs between time t − 1 and t, where k = 1, 2, . . . , K. If a release of announcement type k takes place between time t − 1 and t, then S kt is equal to the standardized surprise, otherwise S kt = 0. equation (2) becomes:
where the coefficient γ k measures the sensitivities of prices to announcement type k.
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I further generalize equation (3) by allowing the microstructure parameters to change around announcements and with characteristics of the announcement. Specifically, I include dummy variables to distinguish when trades occur relative to the time of the announcement release. Additional dummy variables permit the microstructure parameters to vary with γ k , S kτ , and the dispersion among survey forecasts. The specifications are discussed along with the empirical results in the next section.
Since little is known about effectiveness of microstructure models at measuring the determinants of transaction costs in the bond market, I conduct robustness checks using a simple nonparametric approach similar to Koski and Michaely (2000) . This methodology differs from the structural model by focusing on sequences of transaction price changes in order to infer the informational role of trading. The objective is to separate the permanent impact of a trade from its temporary impact. The lasting inf luence of a trade on the price level reveals the information contained in the trade, whereas the temporary impact ref lects dealers' order processing costs and compensation for providing liquidity.
Koski and Michaely (2000) measure variation in the information content of equity trading by calculating excess returns for trades of different sizes around dividend announcements. They control for cross sectional differences in expected returns by calculating excess returns relative to a stock-specific benchmark return for each information period. Since I focus on the most recently issued five-year Treasury note, it is unlikely that the bond will have an expected intraday return different from zero. Thus, I forgo calculating benchmark returns and examine unadjusted transaction returns. 10 In order to confirm the effectiveness of the microstructure model at capturing the impact of trading on prices, I calculate mean transaction price returns for purchases and sales of different trade sizes around announcements and with characteristics of the announcement.
III. Empirical Results
A. Trade Impact Surrounding Economic Announcements
If some dealers are better at determining the precise impact of economic news on prices, either through superior information processing skills or access to customer order f low, theory suggests that the informational role of trading will increase following economic announcements. I examine this hypothesis by allowing the microstructure parameters in equation (3) to vary before and after announcements as follows:
where I N,t = 1 if the transaction at time t takes place on a day without an economic announcement, 0 otherwise. Similarly, the dummy variables I B,t and I A,t designate trades in the half-hour before and after announcements. Letting α represent a constant and using the expressions
and
the following population moments implied by equation (4) exactly identify the
. . .
The first three moments determine the autocorrelation in order f low during the different trading intervals, and the remaining equations represent the OLS normal equations. 11 The results are shown in Table III . Panel A reports the estimates and standard errors for the microstructure parameters. Standard t-tests show that all of the microstructure parameters are significantly different from zero with p-values less than 0.001.
The adverse selection parameter θ , which measures the informational role of trading, changes from 0.65 basis points before announcements to 0.94 basis points after announcements. The Chi-squared statistic for the likelihood ratio test of the restriction θ N = θ B and θ N = θ A is equal to 96.4, which has a p-value less than 0.001. The pattern in θ around announcements confirms the anecdotal evidence in Figure 1 . Order f low contains relatively little information before the release of economic news and more information than usual afterward. The reduced information content of trading prior to the announcement suggests that the information is not leaked in the half-hour before the release. The increased information content of trading following the announcement suggests that public information releases raise the level of information asymmetry in the government bond market.
Also of interest is order processing cost parameter φ, which measures compensation for providing liquidity. Notably, the parameter is consistently negative and significant at the 0.001 level. This suggests that, on average, dealers 11 As in MRR, the moment conditions used to determine the autocorrelation in order f low implicitly force the constant term in the partial autocorrelation regression to be zero. Relaxing this assumption by including an additional moment condition for the constant term does not appreciably change the results. 
0.654 0.943 0.000 0.014 0.022 0.019 consume liquidity in the interdealer market, and their desire to trade mitigates the effects of information asymmetry on transaction costs. Although theory would suggest that φ ≥ 0 in a single dealer environment (the dealer would expect to be compensated for providing liquidity), this restriction may not necessarily hold in a quote driven market. 12 For example, Sandas (2001) finds negative order processing costs in the Stockholm Stock Exchange's limitorder market and argues that these costs could ref lect rational behavior in an environment with heterogeneous valuations. In the current context, the ability to sell to the most optimistic dealer and buy from the most pessimistic dealer effectively lowers transaction costs.
Unobserved customer trading also makes negative order processing costs more plausible. If dealers are able to trade at more favorable prices with their customers, then they may be willing to submit quotes in the interdealer market that appear suboptimal in the sense that they do not fully ref lect the information in order f low. In other words, dealers may consume liquidity in the interdealer market if they are sufficiently compensated for providing liquidity in the retail market.
The idea that dealers use the interdealer market as a source of liquidity is supported by the observation that dealers are not required to submit quotes. Even for the actively traded five-year note, roughly 3% of the time there are no posted quotes on at least one side of the market. Interdealer brokers encourage quote submission by requiring only transaction initiators to pay brokerage fees, which also serves to reduce spreads. A dealer who would like to purchase a Treasury security can avoid the brokerage fee (usually 1/256 th or roughly 0.4 basis points) by posting an attractive bid and waiting for a counterparty rather than initiating a transaction at the ask price. This feature of the interdealer market can result in zero or even small negative bid-ask spreads, which are occasionally observed in the data. For example, sampling quotes when transactions are reported, I find roughly 15% of observed spreads are zero, and 1% are less than zero.
The variation in φ around announcements is intuitive. The order processing cost parameter φ is greater than usual (−0.25) before announcements and smaller than usual (−0.41) afterward. The Chi-squared statistic for the likelihood ratio test of the restriction φ N = φ B and φ N = φ A is equal to 36.4, which rejects the null at the 0.001 level. The increased price uncertainty before announcements makes dealers more reluctant to trade. After the information release, increased trading activity and the reduction in price uncertainty increases dealers' willingness to provide liquidity.
Order f low is subject to a considerable amount of autocorrelation, suggesting that orders are typically broken-up into smaller trades. The autocorrelation coefficient ρ varies from 0.49 before announcements to 0.54 after. The Chisquared statistic for the likelihood ratio test of the restriction ρ N = ρ B and ρ N = ρ A is equal to 23.4, which is significant at the 0.001 level. The estimates indicate that orders are slightly more likely to be separated into different trades following economic news releases.
Panel B of Table III reports the coefficients γ k and standard errors for the sensitivity of prices to the surprise component of anticipated economic announcements. In general, procyclical indicators such as Housing Starts negatively impact prices, whereas, counter-cyclical variables such as initial jobless claims have a positive impact on prices. Eight of the twelve surprise coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level, the exceptions being the Index of leading indicators, trade balances, exports, and imports. The price impact varies considerably across announcements with nonfarm payrolls having the largest effect on prices. A one standard deviation positive surprise in Nonfarm Payrolls results in a 28 basis point drop in price. The coefficients for the other announcements are smaller, ranging from 12 basis points for the producer price index to three basis points for initial jobless claims.
B. Robustness Checks
The model estimates suggest that transaction costs in the interdealer market for Treasury securities are primarily driven by information asymmetry. Moreover, the results indicate that the compensation for providing liquidity in the interdealer market is negative, which implies that quotes are not fully incorporating the information contained in order f low. This result may be related to heterogeneous valuations, as suggested by Sandas (2001) , or inf luenced by unobserved customer trading and the one-sided fee structure of the interdealer market. However, it does raise concerns about model mis-specification. In this section, I build support for the model estimates through a number of robustness checks.
I begin with an alternate approach to infer the informational role of trading. The methodology is based on Koski and Michaely (2000) and relies on the sequence of transaction returns to measure the impact of trading on prices. Specifically, I calculate mean cumulative transaction returns for purchases and sales of different sizes surrounding economic announcements. I sort trades into three size groups based on the 33 rd and 67 th percentiles, which are $4 million and $8 million. Figure 2 plots cumulative transaction returns measured from five trades before to five trades after the trade of interest.
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The pattern in Figure 2 corroborates the results in Table III . For each trade size, the inf luence of trading on price changes is higher than usual following announcements and lower than usual before announcements. The variation in price impact around announcements is larger for purchases than for sales, which is an asymmetry not captured by the model. The figure does, however, provide support for the model's negative estimate of the order processing cost. The cumulative transaction returns do not exhibit the reversals commonly observed in equity markets. Price reversals are associated with the temporary impact of trading on prices and are interpreted as ref lecting compensation for providing liquidity. Figure 2 shows that cumulative transaction returns continue upward after purchases and downward after sales, suggesting that dealers' submitted quotes are not fully incorporating the autocorrelation in order f low. Trade size appears to have little inf luence on trade impact. For both purchases and sales, trades between $4 and $8 million have a larger impact on prices than smaller or larger trades, but the difference is relatively small. Moreover, changing the large trade size category to ref lect more extreme sizes, using the 95 th percentile of $25 million, does not increase the trade impact. The minimal role of size on trade impact may be related to institutional details of the interdealer market. Although trades occur at posted quotes, trade size can be negotiated through the broker. Quote submitters concerned about information asymmetry would be less likely to allow the trade size to be worked up. This is consistent with Boni and Leach (2002) who find evidence that trade work-ups are smaller than usual following economic announcements.
The pattern in cumulative returns around announcements may be partially driven by differences in the autocorrelation of trading. In order to gauge the statistical significance of the differences in price impact around announcements, Table IV reports noncumulative transaction returns from two trades before to two trades after the transaction of interest. The table shows the difference between the mean transaction return in periods with and without announcements. Statistical significance is measured using two-sample t-tests as well as two-sample nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (see Siegel and Castellan (1988) for details). The average purchase transaction return for medium-sized trades is 0.085 basis points lower before announcements and 0.074 basis points higher after announcements. The statistical tests generally support that the differences are significant for purchases of all trade sizes. Large trades prior to announcements are particularly uninformative and may ref lect "sunshine" trading as modeled by Admati and Pf leiderer (1991) .
Together, the price impact results support the estimates of the model and indicate that the fixed trade size assumption is not overly restrictive.
14 Another useful inference from Table IV and Figure 2 is that for the interdealer market for U.S. Treasury securities, relying on the autocorrelation in order to infer the informational component of the effective spread is more appropriate than assuming that the information content of trading grows linearly with size, which is the approach in Umlauf (1991) and Vitale (1998) .
An additional approach for evaluating model performance is to examine how well it measures transaction costs. In the MRR setup, the model parameters imply a bid-ask spread equal to 2(θ + φ). Panel A of Table V reports average quoted spreads and model-implied spreads for periods around announcements; standard errors are calculated using the covariance matrix of the GMM estimators. The spread component estimates do not rely on bid-ask quotes, but are instead inferred from the auto-covariance and other moment conditions of transaction price changes. As a result, model-implied spreads are not constrained to be equal to quoted spreads. Table V shows that the model produces bid-ask spreads that are smaller than observed quoted spreads. Although MRR find a similar result in equity markets, the downward bias does raise concerns about model mis-specification. On the other hand, given that quotes can change between the trades of a 
Bid-Ask Spreads and Execution Costs around Economic Announcements
The round-trip transaction, it is not clear whether quoted spreads or the model's implied spreads provide a better measure of round-trip transaction costs. I develop an alternative measure of transaction costs by comparing average price changes for offsetting trades over different time intervals. Switching from transaction time, which is the approach in Tables III and IV , to calendar time helps control for differences in trading intensity across subsamples. I also adjust for broken-up orders, as indicated by the high autocorrelation in order f low, by aggregating uninterrupted sequences of buy or sell transactions.
15 Aggregated trades are characterized by cumulative volume and the volume-weighted average price. For each aggregated transaction and for each time interval, transaction costs are measured by comparing the purchase (sale) price to the sale (purchase) price of the first available volume-offsetting aggregate transaction within the given time interval. Table V reports average transaction costs for trades unwound within five minutes, between 5 and 10 minutes, and between 10 and 15 minutes. The table shows that transaction costs generally increase with the length of the round-trip transaction. On days without announcements, unwinding within five minutes results in average transaction costs of 0.6 basis points, whereas unwinding between 10 and 15 minutes results in transactions costs of 1.6 basis points. This result suggests that aggregating sequences of buys or sells may not completely control for broken-up orders. Transaction costs tend to level off after 15 minutes. Extending the time horizon beyond that reported in the table to 15 to 20, 20 to 25, and 25 to 30 minutes results in average transaction costs of 1.5, 1.6, and 1.4 basis points.
More importantly, the variation in transaction costs around economic announcements more closely matches model implied spreads than quoted spreads. While average quoted spreads are larger than usual prior to economic news releases and decrease afterward, the model estimates indicate that effective spreads display the opposite pattern. The results in Panel B support the model's interpretation. Regardless of the time interval considered, round-trip transaction costs in the 15 minutes after announcements are roughly twice as large after economic announcements as before. Transaction costs return closer to normal levels in the next 15 minutes. While model implied spreads vary with quoted spreads more generally, 16 the results indicate that the preponderance of broken-up orders combined with increased movement of quotes between transactions makes quoted bid-ask spreads a relatively poor measure of transaction costs around announcements.
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Taken together, the robustness checks support the effectiveness of the structural model at measuring the informational role of trading. Although caution should be exercised when using the model to infer the precise level of transaction costs, the evidence suggests that model implied spreads are more successful than quoted spreads at capturing the variation in transaction costs around announcements. In addition, the nonparametric price impact results support the sign of the parameter estimates and indicate that the model is successful at measuring changes in the sensitivity of prices to order f low.
In summary, the model estimates and nonparametric results indicate that the release of macroeconomic news increases the level of information asymmetry 16 I estimate the model on nonannouncement days sorted into quartiles based on average quoted spreads and find model implied spreads increase monotonically with quoted spreads.
17 Additional evidence for the inability of quoted spreads to capture variation in transaction costs around announcements is obtained by examining transaction price changes for trades where quoted spreads are zero at both time t and t -1. Individual (nonaggregated) trades at time t -1 that are unwound at time t result in average transaction costs of 0.05 basis points before announcements and 0.17 basis points after announcements, and the means are statistically different at the 0.01 level according to two sample t-tests.
in the government bond market. The increased informational role of trading is consistent with differences in the ability of market participants to interpret how economic data inf luences riskless rates. Alternatively, the information asymmetry may also be related to inventory-oriented information that is security specific. To help characterize the source of the information asymmetry, I begin by examining the evolution of trade impact following economic announcements. Table II shows that trading intensity in the half hour after economic announcements is approximately twice as large as on days without announcements. Moreover, Fleming and Remolona (1999) document the pattern of increased trading activity continues for roughly four hours after 8:30 a.m. announcements. 18 The extended period of active trading suggests that announcements may induce market participants to rebalance or rehedge their portfolios.
C. The Evolution of Trade Impact around Announcements
While increased trading activity typically lowers transaction costs, it may also generate inventory related information asymmetry. In the model of Cao et al. (2002) , compensation for bearing inventory risk introduces a link between order f low and prices. As a result, dealers' private access to customer order f low provides them with a useful indicator of short-term price movements. In the current setting, the increased trading activity following announcements may potentially increase the value of dealers' access to customer order f low. Table II shows that price volatility drops considerably within 15 minutes of the announcement, which would encourage patience on the part of uninformed liquidity motivated traders. As a result, we might expect inventory-oriented information asymmetry to be gradually reduced as customers submit their orders to dealers. On the other hand, if the information asymmetry is related to variations in skill at interpreting economic news, a rapid decline in the informational role of trading seems more plausible. A Treasury market participant who has skill at determining how economic data inf luence riskless rates is unlikely to possess a monopoly on this type of expertise. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) show that competition among multiple informed traders leads prices to incorporate private information quickly. In the current setting, this implies that the informational role of trading will decline as time passes after the announcement. I examine this conjecture by estimating the following equation: (8) where I A1,t = 1 if the transaction at time t takes place within 15 minutes after the announcement, and 0 otherwise; and I A2,t = 1 if the trade occurs between 15 and 30 minutes after an announcement, and 0 otherwise. Letting α represent a constant and using the expressions
the moment conditions imposed by this version of the model are
The results are presented in Table VI . The adverse selection parameter θ is highest in the first 15 minutes after the announcement (1.01), and then returns to near-normal levels in the next 15 minutes (0.88), even as trading intensity increases (as shown in Table II ). The Chi-squared statistic for the likelihood ratio test that θ A1 = θ A2 is equal to 41.2, which rejects the null with a p-value less than 0.001. The quick decline in the informational role of trading is consistent with the multiple informed trader model of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and supports the interpretation that market participants vary in skill at determining how economic news inf luences riskless rates.
A similar approach can be used to examine whether there is evidence of informed trading prior to the release. I estimate an equation analogous to equation (8) for the before-announcement period. The results are also reported in Table VI . Although there is an increase in the informational role of trading between the two 15 minute intervals leading up to the announcement, both estimates are lower than the estimate during the period without announcements shown in Table III . The results do not indicate that traders trade speculatively in the half-hour before announcements.
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Table VI
Proximity to the News Release and Components of the Effective Spread
The table reports GMM estimates from the model fit to transaction price changes for the active fiveyear Treasury note during the half-hour following economic announcements from the period July 1, 1991 to September 29, 1995. Indicator variables are used to allow the model parameters to vary in 15-minute intervals surrounding the announcement release times, which occur at 8:30 a.m. ET. The table reports the estimated components of the effective spread. The parameter subscript "B1" refers to estimates from trades from 30 to 15 minutes before the announcement (8:00-8:15), and "B2" refers to the 15 minutes before announcements (8:15-8:30). Subscript "A1" refers to estimates from trades in the 15 minutes after the announcement (8:30-8:45), and "A2" refers to the second 15-minute interval (8:45-9:00). Also shown are the restrictions and Chi-square p-values for tests that compare the restricted and unrestricted GMM criterion functions. 
D. Trade Impact and Announcement Characteristics
Theory offers predictions on how the informational role of trading will vary with characteristics of the announcement, which provides another opportunity for clarifying the nature of information asymmetry in government bond markets. In this section I study how trade impact varies with the surprise and precision of the announcement as well as the divergence in analyst forecasts.
In the skilled information processor models of Verrecchia (1994, 1997) , information processors' skill at interpreting public information is independent of the precision of the public information. Thus, following more precise public information releases the level of information asymmetry is lower, market participants are relatively less concerned about trading with skilled information processors, and the informational role of trading is smaller.
The opposite relation could hold if the information asymmetry is related to dealer inventories. Given that announcements with greater price impacts would likely generate larger shocks to investors' hedging demands, dealers with access to sizable customer order f lows would possess a greater informational advantage following more precise information releases. In this setting, we would expect the informational role of trading to be higher following more precise public information releases. Karpoff's (1986) model of trading volume offers additional insights. In an environment with market participants heterogeneous in either their personal valuations or liquidity needs, he demonstrates that trading volume can increase following a public information event even if market participants interpret the information identically, provided they had divergent prior expectations. If the information asymmetry following economic announcements is driven by the heterogeneous liquidity needs of retail customers, Karpoff 's model would predict greater levels of information asymmetry about customer demands following announcements with more divergent prior expectations.
Although these modeling approaches have different implications, their interpretations are not mutually exclusive. For example, a better understanding of how economic news inf luences hedging demands could be considered a superior information processing ability in the Verrecchia (1994, 1997) setup. Similarly, retail customers could be skilled information processors, which would make inventories informative in the Cao et al. (2002) model. Moreover, even if retail customers are uninformed, their order f low could reveal fundamental information about the yield curve if it ref lects a shift in investor preferences. Although cross-sectional results are not able to provide a mutually exclusive interpretation, they do provide additional evidence to help characterize the nature of information asymmetry.
I begin by using a two-step procedure to allow the microstructure parameters to vary with the estimated price impact of that day's announcements. Equation (3), repeated here for expositional purposes, specifies the following relation between transaction price changes and announcement surprises:
If an announcement of type k takes place between trades t − 1 and t, S kt is equal to the standardized surprise, otherwise S kt = 0. As detailed in equation (1), surprises are defined as the difference between the announced value and the survey forecast, scaled by the standard deviation of all surprises for that macro series. Thus, S kt = 1.0 implies a surprise that is one standard deviation greater than zero for that announcement type. I first estimate equation (3) and obtain γ k , which measures the sensitivity of prices to announcement type k. For each day τ on which an announcement occurs, I then calculate the estimated cumulative price impact, | γ k S kτ | for day τ 's announcements. I then sort trades into three categories using the 33 rd and 67 th percentiles of | γ k S kτ |. Next, for transactions in the half-hour following announcements, I estimate p t − p t−1 = (φ 1 + θ 1 )I 1,t x t + (φ 2 + θ 2 )I 2,t x t + (φ 3 + θ 3 )I 3,t x t − (φ 1 + ρ 1 θ 1 )I 1,t−1 x t−1 − (φ 2 + ρ 2 θ 2 )I A,t−1 x t−1
where the subscripts 1, 2, and 3 denote the lowest, middle, and highest tritiles of | γ k S kτ |. The moment conditions implied by this version of the model are analogous to those shown in equation (11). The results are reported in Panel A of Table VII. The table shows that the informational role of trading following economic announcements increases with the estimated price impact of the announcement. The variation in θ shows a monotonic increase across announcement impact groups: 0.81, 0.90, and 1.07. The Chi-squared statistic for the likelihood ratio test that the parameters are equal is 49.75, which has a p-value less than 0.001.
I more explicitly characterize the relation between announcement price impact and the subsequent informational role of trading by partitioning announcement impact into components related to the precision of the information and the magnitude of the surprise. To the extent that economic news releases provide a public signal about the value of government bonds, |γ k |, which measures the average sensitivity of prices to surprises in macro series k, proxies for the precision of the public signal. For each announcement day τ , I calculate |γ k I kτ |, where γ k is estimated from equation (3), and I kτ = 1 if announcement type k occurred on that day, 0 otherwise. The sum of the precisions is analogous to the price impact constraining the surprise component for each announcement to equal 1. A cumulative surprise component is created in a similar manner. For each announcement day τ , I calculate |S kτ |, which is analogous to constraining all announcements to have the same level of precision.
I then re-estimate equation (12), this time double sorting trades into nine groups based on 33 rd and 67 th percentiles of |γ k I kτ | and |S kτ |. The results are reported in panel B of Table VII. The model estimates indicate that the informational role of trading increases monotonically with both the precision of the public information and the magnitude of the announcement surprise. The informational component of the spread θ varies across the announcement precision groups from 0.79 to 1.07 basis points and across the surprise groups from 0.82 to 1.04 basis points. Chi-squared tests reject that the parameters are equal across the subsamples with a p-value less than 0.001.
As a robustness check for the model estimates in Table VII , Figure 3 shows cumulative transaction returns for trades sorted into the three groups based on the announcement surprise | S kτ |, precision |γ k I kτ |, and combined price impact | γ k S kτ |. The pattern for purchase transactions supports the model estimates in that a clear monotonic relation holds between the price impact and the magnitude of the announcement surprise and estimated precision. Although, for the sake of brevity, I do not report a full table of mean transaction returns (as in Table IV) , two sample t-tests, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject with a p-value less than 0.001 that the transaction returns for the trade of interest are equal for the highest and lowest tritiles of announcement surprise, announcement precision, and the estimated price impact of the announcement. Although the results for sale transactions are less robust in that the pattern is monotonic and significant only for announcement precision, Figure 3 generally confirms the effectiveness of the model at measuring the inf luence of announcement characteristics on the informational role of trading. 
Estimated Price Impact and Components of the Effective Spread
The table reports GMM estimates from the model fit to transaction price changes for the active five-year Treasury note during the half-hour following economic announcements from the period July 1, 1991 to September 29, 1995. In each panel, the parameters are allowed to vary with announcement characteristics using indicator variables based on the 33 rd and 67 th percentiles. In Panel A, the parameters vary with the total estimated price impact of that day's announcements, | γ k S kt |, where S kt is the announcement surprise and γ k is the estimated sensitivity of prices to announcement type k as estimated in Table III The chart shows cumulative returns based on transaction prices relative to the purchase or sale of interest. In the top row, trades are sorted into three groups using the 33 rd and 67 th percentiles of that day's cumulative announcement surprise |S kt |. In the second row, trades are sorted into groups based on the level of that day's cumulative announcement precision |γ k I kt |, where γ k is the sensitivity of prices to announcement type k as estimated in Table III , and I kt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if announcement type k is released on day τ , and 0 otherwise. In the last row, returns are shown for the trades sorted into groups based on the combined impact of that day's announcements | γ k S kt |. The sample contains trades of the active five-year Treasury note from 8:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. ET on days with economic announcements during the period July 1, 1991 to September 29, 1995. If the increased information asymmetry among Treasury dealers following economic announcements is inf luenced by the heterogeneous rebalancing demands of retail customers, Karpoff's (1986) theory of trading volume predicts greater information asymmetry following announcements with more divergent Trades are sorted into three groups using the 33 rd and 67 th percentiles of two measures of forecast dispersion. In the first row, dispersion among analysts' forecasts of macroeconomic data is measured as the difference between the 75 th and 25 th percentile forecasts. In the second row, forecast dispersion is measured as the SD of analysts' forecasts. The sample contains trades for the active five-year Treasury note from 8:30 a.m. to 9:00 am ET on days with economic announcements during the period July 1, 1991 to September 29, 1995. component of the spread θ is not sensitive to changes in forecast dispersion when measured by the interquartile range, it does increase significantly with the standard deviation of forecasts. The apparent difference between the two cumulative dispersion measures is somewhat surprising given the high correlation between the two proxies (0.7).
20 One possible interpretation is that the presence of outlying forecasts, which could inf luence standard deviation without affecting the interquartile range, more accurately indicates diverse expectations.
Although data on individual forecasts is unavailable, additional evidence for the summary dispersion measures is provided in Figure 4 , which shows the price impact results after sorting into groups by D per kτ and D std kτ . The results indicate that the relation between forecast standard deviation and the informational role of trading is less robust. Neither purchases nor sales display a clear monotonic pattern for either measure of dispersion. Together, the results provide weak support to the conjecture that announcements with greater forecast dispersion generate more rehedging demands and lead to greater levels of information asymmetry.
Overall, the results in this section indicate a positive relation between the inf luence of economic news on prices and the subsequent informational role of trading. The relation is associated with both the surprise component of the announcement as well as the importance of the macroeconomic series as measured by the average price response. While the evidence presents a challenge to existing information processor models, these could be adapted to ref lect this result. In the context of the Verrecchia (1994, 1997 ) models, the results suggest that information processors' skills are not independent of the public signal, but instead improve with the surprise and precision of the public information. Incorporating this feature would not alter the fundamental implications of their theory. Moreover, extending the models in this way seems plausible given that skilled economists are likely to devote greater efforts to interpreting economic news considered to be important by the market.
IV. Conclusion
This paper studies the inf luence of macroeconomic news releases on the informational role of trading in the U.S. government bond market. I rely on a structural model to infer the component of effective spreads related to information asymmetry, and study how the informational role of trading varies around news releases and with characteristics of the announcement. Nonparametric robustness checks confirm the effectiveness of the model at capturing variation in the information content of trading.
I find that prices show an increased sensitivity to order f low in the halfhour following economic announcements, which suggests the release of public information increases the level of information asymmetry in the government bond market. Although trading activity remains high for several hours after announcements, the level of information asymmetry returns to near-normal levels within 15 minutes. The evidence suggests that market participants actively watch trading to help determine the inf luence of new economic information on riskless rates. The informational role of trading increases with the initial impact of the announcement, and the relation is associated with both the surprise component of the announcement and the precision of the public information. The results are consistent with the presence of superior information processors whose comparative advantage improves with the importance of the public information release.
The hypothesis that government bond order f low reveals fundamental information about the yield curve is confirmed by the work of Fleming (2001) and Brandt and Kavajecz (2003) , who show that order f low maintains its informational role at the daily and weekly level as well as across securities of different maturities. However, an important contrast emerges when characterizing the conditions under which trading is especially informative. Fleming (2001) and Brandt and Kavajecz (2003) document that trade impact increases during periods of low liquidity, which they argue ref lects uncertainty regarding valuation. I find that macroeconomic announcements lead to high liquidity as well as increased trade impact, suggesting that the release of economic information generates uncertainty about the appropriate level of riskless rates. The results indicate that information asymmetry in the government bond market arises not from the absence of relevant public information, but rather from differences in the ability of market participants to interpret the information.
